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HOLDINGS,INC., : Business Case Division 3
Defendant.
 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT CUENTAS’S MOTION TO STRIKE
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Cuentas’s Motionto Strike
Plaintiff JP Carey’s Late Expert Affidavit of John F. Coyle, filed May 5, 2020
(“Motion”). Having reviewed the record and considered the arguments and
submissions of counsel, the Court enters the following order.
1. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The present dispute concerns whetherlate-disclosed expert evidence should
be excluded. Trial courts hearing civil matters generally “possess broad discretion
... to control the sequenceand timingofdiscovery, see O.C.G.A.§ 9-11-26(d), and
to establish pretrial procedure, see O.C.G.A. § 9-11-16(a)(5).” (Citation and
punctuation omitted.) Rivera_v. Washington, 298 Ga. 770, 777-778 (2016).
However, while a trial court has wide latitude to enter scheduling orders, when
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enforcing such orders,“a trial court can abuseits discretion by imposing a sanction
that is too harsh under the circumstancesofthe case.” Lee v. Smith, 307 Ga. 815,
821 (2020). Lee establishes four factorsfora trial court to consider when evaluating
if to exclude a late-identified witness. They are:
(1) the explanation for the failure to disclose the witness,
(2) the importanceofthe testimony,
(3) the prejudice to the opposing party if the witnessis allowedtotestify, and
(4) whether a less harsh remedy than the exclusion of the witness would be
sufficient to ameliorate the prejudice and vindicatethetrial court’s authority.
Id. at 824. Lee reasoned analyzing these factors would allow trial court “to
properly balance the circumstances surrounding a party’s failure to comply” with
court-imposed deadlines against a “trial court’s need to fashion an appropriate
remedy” for such non-compliance. Id. Here, the parties agree that Lee sets forth
the governing authority for this Motion.
2. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff JP Carey Enterprises, Inc. (“JP Carey”)filed this action in the Fulton
County Superior Court on December 14, 2018 seeking to recover on a convertible
promissory note (“Note”) from Defendant Cuentas, Inc. f/k/a Next Group Holdings,
Inc. (“Cuentas”).' During discovery, Cuentas propoundedinterrogatories expressly
' JP Careyoriginally initiated this action in Florida on December20, 2017,andit was subsequently
dismissed in October of 2018. (Motion. Ex. 1). In Paragraph 14 of the Note, the parties selected Fulton
County as the forum for resolving disputes related to the Note.
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requesting JP Carey to identify any expert it intended to call and specify certain
information regarding that expert’s opinion. On September 25, 2019, JP Carey
responded “[i]t has not yet selected a testifying expert witness. [JP Carey] will
amend its response as required by Georgia law.” (Motion, Ex. 2, Interrogatory
Response Nos. 10-11). Pursuant to the initial Scheduling Order,all fact and expert
discovery ended on October 15, 2019. (Scheduling Order, entered June 21, 2019).
At the joint request of the parties, the Scheduling Order was amended to extend
document production and depositions through November 22, 2019 and the deadline
to file Daubert and dispositive motions through January 24, 2020. (Order Modifying
Scheduling Order, entered November15, 2019).
On January 24, 2020, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.
Aspart of its motion for summary judgment, Cuentas argued the Note’s remedial
provisions were legally unenforceable. On January 31, 2020, JP Carey first
contacted Professor John F. Coyle, a professor at the University of North Carolina
School of Law, who has authored several academic articles on convertible notes like
the one at issue. (Response, p. 4; Coyle Affidavit, J] 2-3). JP Carey formally
retained Professor Coyle on February 24, 2020. (Response, p. 4). He executedhis
58-paragraph expert affidavit (“Affidavit”) on March 2, 2020. However, JP Carey
did not promptly supplementits discovery responses to identify Professor Coyle.
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Cuentasfirst learned of his identification and opinion on April 27, 2020 when JP
Carey attached the Affidavit to its Motion for Leaveto File Reply Brief.
On the morning of May 5, 2020, Cuentasfiled the present Motion seeking to
strike the Affidavit based upon the belated identification of the expert. JP Carey
asserts thatit did supplementits interrogatory responses regarding Professor Coyle’s
retention as an expert, but does not supply the date on which the supplementation
was made. (Response, p. 4). The Court assumes it was done shortly after this
Motion wasfiled, as reflected in a Rule 5.2 Certificate of Service, filed on the
afternoon ofMay 5, 2020. This matter was transferred to the Business Case Division
on June 23, 2020. An order permitting JP Carey to file its reply brief in further
support of its motion for summaryjudgment wasentered on June 26, 2020; however,
the issue regarding this Motionto strike the Affidavit was reserved.
3. LEGAL CONCLUSIONS
As to the first factor of the Lee analysis, the explanation for the late
identification, JP Carey claims it always considered the case to be a basic dispute
regarding breach of a note. It asserts the need for expert evidence, “did not fully
crystallize” until January 24, 2020 when Cuentas sought summary judgment,
arguing the Note’s remedial provisions were unenforceable under Georgia’s
liquidated damages law. (Response, p. 6). However, JP Carey vaguely
acknowledgesit earlier learned of this unenforceability argument during settlement
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negotiations with Cuentas that occurred at someprior, unspecified time. (JP Carey’s
Response,fn. 1). Further, JP Carey retained Professor Coyle on February 24, 2020.
His lengthy Affidavit was prepared and then executed within a week. However, JP
Carey did not inform Cuentasofthis expert witness or his opinion for the following
eight weeks, until April 27, 2020 when JP Carey filed a pleading on the record.?
Reviewing this chronology, the Court finds JP Carey’s explanation for delay in
disclosing Professor Coyle is unsatisfactory. Indeed, the delay suggests it may have
been the result oflitigation tactics, motivated by the desire to surprise Cuentas with
this expert witness and/or delay resolution of the pending summary judgment
motions.
The second factor of the Lee analysis focuses on the import of the evidence
offered by the late-identified witness. Longstanding Georgialaw establishes a three-
part test for determining whether a contract provision allows for recoverable
liquidated damages or unenforceable penalty damages. Southeastern Land Fund.
 
Inc. v. Real Estate World, Inc., 237 Ga. 227, 230 (1976) see also West Asset Mgmt.
 
Inc. v. NW_ Parkway, LLC, 336 Ga. App. 775 (2016). The Affidavit mainly
° The Court rejects any suggestion the Covid 19 pandemic may have caused this delay. (Response, pp. 5-
6). As outlined above, JP Carey was working with Professor Coyle throughout February 2020 and retained
him at the end of that month. His lengthy Affidavit was executed on March 2, 2020. This Court entered
an Order Declaring a Judicial Emergency on March 13, 2020. The Georgia Supreme Court enteredits
initial Order Declaring Statewide Judicial Emergency on March 14, 2020. Thus, the Court finds that JP
Carey was aware of its expert’s identity for approximately three weeks and his specific opinion for
approximately two weeks before these emergency orders were entered oreither of their deadline tolling
provisionstook effect.
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addressesthe third part of the test, whether the Note’s damage provisions contain “a
reasonable effort to pre-estimate damages.” (Coyle Aff. { 6, 16, 58). Professor
Coyle’s Affidavit also offers legal opinions that the second requirementofthetest
has been met. (Coyle Aff., {9 6, 16, 34-35, 40, 49, 50, 55, 58). The Court would
not consider his legal opinions as part of its summary judgment analysis.7 The
remainder of the Affidavit does contain some useful background distinguishing
convertible notes from more standard promissory notes; however, the Court agrees
with Cuentas that much ofthe Affidavit offers legal argument “dressed up” in the
guise of expert testimony. (Motion, p. 5). Professor Coyle’s final opinion that the
Note contains a reasonable pre-estimate of damagesis buttressed by “a review ofthe
relevant academic literature” and specific cites to several scholarly articles. (Coyle
Aff., § 36-39). As for the background information and legal survey contained
within the Affidavit, the Court finds it could be presented ably by a lawyer through
pleadings and argument, without the need for expert testimony. Therefore, the Court
determines that the information found in the Affidavit, while useful, is not of
significant import.
> In reviewing the denial of a motion for summary judgment, the Georgia Court of Appeals foundit
necessaryto clarify the scopeofits review of an expert affidavit. “To be clear, we do not rely on the expert’s
testimony to the extent that the expert offers conclusions as to the legal questions raised by the case but
merely to the extent that the expert offers opinions” on industry standards. Miller v. Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc., 339 Ga. App. 638, fn. 9 (2016). This Court now offers a similarclarification.
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The third factor ofthe Lee analysis requires the Court to considerthe prejudice
to the opposingparty if the late-identified witness were allowedtotestify. JP Carey
proposes to remedy any prejudice by allowing Cuentas to take the deposition of
Professor Coyle, but this solution creates a cascade ofnew deadlines seeking merely
to even the playing field established by the Court’s prior scheduling orders. After
taking Professor Coyle’s deposition, Cuentas would need the opportunity to identify
its own expert that JP Carey would then need to depose. This would necessitate a
new deadline for the parties to file Daubert motions. Also, the opportunity for
additional briefing on the pending summary judgment motions would likely be
required. Additionally, allowing this late-identified witness would not only expand
the litigation and further delay consideration of the motions for summary judgment,
it would be fundamentally prejudicial for the Defendant to re-calculate its defenses
andlitigation strategy after it has already filed its motion for summary judgment.
In considering the final factor of the Lee analysis, the Court is not convinced
that a “less harsh remedy than the exclusion of the witness would be sufficient to
ameliorate the prejudice and vindicate the trial court’s authority.” Lee at 824. Based
upon thetrial court’s determination that this expert evidence is morein the nature of
legal argument, capable of being presented by a lawyer without the need for expert
testimony, and the unsatisfactory reasons offered for the delayed disclosure, the
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Court does not find the end result of excluding the late-identified expert to be
unnecessarily harsh.
Moreover,this particular record reflects vindication of the Court’s scheduling
authority is a worthy objective. JP Carey learned ofthe enforceability issue during
settlement discussions and has not been forthright as to precisely when those
discussions occurred. Thus, the Court is not convinced that JP Carey was surprised
by the defense when it was raised in Cuentas’s motion for summary judgment.
Additionally, JP Carey has not offered a wholly satisfactory explanation for its delay
in identifying Professor Coyle. The Court does not want to encourage
gamesmanshipin the discovery and motions phase of a complex business case. One
party, through oversight or choice, should not be allowed to consider the other
party’s best argument completely outlined in a motion for summary judgment, then
scrambleto offer a response that will necessarily spark a whole new setofdiscovery
and briefing deadlines for both parties. This approach not only serves to
unnecessarily prolong thelitigation and increase legal expense, it hamstrings the
compliant opposing party at a late stage in the case where the prejudiceis difficult
to remedy.
* The Court furthernotesin light of the Covid 19 pandemic and the corresponding judicial emergency
orders, this Court expects to be facing a tremendousbacklogofcases, both civil and criminal. With this
pressing problem, the need forattorneys to be attentive to and respectful of the Court’s scheduling
deadlines cannot be overemphasized. This consideration also plays into the Court’s analysis with regard
to the third and fourth Lee factors.
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Forall of the above-stated reasons, it is hereby ordered that the Motion is




day of September, 2020.
lityfe Ute
The Honbfable Kelly Lee Ellerbe, Judge





Filed and Served via Odyssey eFileGA
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